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Federal and State Handicapped Discrimination
Laws: Toward an Accommodating Legal
Framework
By: Michael J. Kaufman*
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal and state legislation protecting handicapped persons
from discrimination is recent, relative to other antidiscrimination
legislation. Accordingly, the scope of the legislative protection for
handicapped persons is often undefined. Courts, local commis-
sions, and litigants frequently are left grasping for some prescrip-
tive norm.' The Supreme Court gradually has developed that
norm under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Sec-
tion 504" or "Rehabilitation Act"), by balancing the goals of the
statute against countervailing policy considerations. As judicial
experience with handicapped discrimination grows, so too will
technological advances that render irrelevant any descriptive dif-
ferences between the abilities of handicapped and nonhandicapped
persons.2 Any standard of protection based upon a balance of stat-
utory goals and countervailing policies therefore must be suffi-
ciently flexible to account for these advances. Yet, in order to
supply clarity, the standard also must draw upon familiar common
law and statutory frameworks successfully used in analogous areas
of the law.
This article will illustrate that when interpreting federal and
state handicapped discrimination laws, the Supreme Court and lo-
* Assistant Professor, Loyola University of Chicago School of Law, Chicago, Illi-
nois. A.B., 1980, Kenyon college; M.A., J.D., 1983, the University of Michigan.
1. A prescriptive norm is a standard of conduct which does not describe current con-
ditions, but dictates a state of affairs which courts or legislative bodies have deemed ideal
and thus worthy of pursuit.
2. The words "description" or "descriptive," as used throughout this article, define
the relationship between one's ability and one's determinable physical characteristics in
terms of current factual conditions. They exclude any analysis based upon whether one's
condition should be related to one's ability. A descriptive definition of a handicapped
person is one that describes in value-free terms the physical characteristics of that person.
A descriptive relationship thus is different from a prescriptive one. Prescription does not
describe a current situation; it prescribes a condition which a court or legislative body
considers to be ideal. If one's characteristic should not be related to one's ability, it is
"prescriptively" unrelated to one's ability.
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cal adjudicative bodies have developed standards that adapt famil-
iar common law and statutory structures to the unfamiliar area of
handicapped discrimination. This article will illuminate this pro-
cess of interpretation by comparing Section 504 with the Illinois
Human Rights Act ("the IHRA" or "the Act"), a model of state
statutes protecting handicapped persons.
This article first describes the Illinois Human Rights Commis-
sion's ("the Commission") abandonment of a descriptive definition
of the term "handicapped individual." The article next traces the
Supreme Court's various interpretations of Section 504, which to-
gether justify the Commission's embrace of a prescriptive definition
of the term handicapped and help define the prescriptive duty that
public accommodators under the IHRA owe to individuals with
determinable physical characteristics. This article then shows that
the Supreme Court's reasoning requires that a greater duty be
placed upon public accommodators under the IHRA than is in-
cumbent upon federal grantees. Finally, this article suggests that
in light of the prescriptive duties created by Section 504 and the
IHRA, the trial of a handicapped discrimination case falls into one
of two compatible evidentiary frameworks-a common law or stat-
utory framework.
II. THE ILLINOIS HUMAN RIGHTS ACT'S PRESCRIPTIVE DUTY
The Illinois Human Rights Act3 grants "handicapped" individu-
als a private right of action against persons who deny to them the
"full and equal enjoyment" of places of public accommodation.4
The Act also encourages state actors and governmental instrumen-
talities "rigorously [to] take affirmative action to provide equality
of opportunity" for handicapped persons and to "eliminate the ef-
fects of past discrimination" against handicapped persons in
"the[ir] internal affairs ... and in their relations with the public."5
Although the Act's substantive protections of "handicapped" per-
sons are great, its definition of a handicapped person can be read to
exclude each of these protections. Under the Act, a handicapped
person, for purposes of discrimination in places of public accom-
modation, is one whose "determinable physical or mental charac-
teristics" are "unrelated" to his or her ability to "utilize and benefit
3. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, paras. 1-101-9-102 (1985).
4. Id. at para. 5-102(A).
5. Id. at para. 1-102(D).
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from the place of public accommodation." 6 This definition appears
to eliminate from the Act's protections virtually all individuals
commonly described as handicapped. A "determinable physical or
mental characteristic" is always "related" in one form or another
to one's ability to utilize and benefit from a place of public accom-
modation. If the definition of handicap hinges on a description of
this relationship, no one would be deemed handicapped because
such a relationship always could be described.
With slight difficulty, for example, a blind man enters a soda
shop only to be kicked out by the shopkeeper who says: "We don't
want any blind people in here." The shopkeeper actually has dis-
played discriminatory animus. Yet, if the Act's definition of
"handicapped" is meant to describe a current state of affairs, as an
evidentiary or factual matter, the blind man would not prevail in a
lawsuit against the shopkeeper. His "determinable physical char-
acteristic," his blindness, is descriptively "related to" his ability to
utilize and benefit from a place of public accommodation. Even if
the blind man has become more adept than a sighted man at utiliz-
ing and benefitting from the soda shop, he could not contend that
his blindness is wholly unrelated to his ability to do so. No matter
how much discriminatory animus a blind man suffers, the Act
would not protect him because he is not "handicapped."
Confronted with the issue of whether the Act's definition of
"handicapped" rendered its protections for handicapped individu-
als meaningless, the Commission promulgated regulations and is-
sued decisions that created a duty of accommodation. 7 In both the
employment and public accommodation contexts, the Commission
has determined that a handicapped individual is one who, despite
any determinable physical characteristic, is able to perform job ac-
tivities, or use and benefit from a place of public accommodation,
with accommodation.8
In May v. Chicago Transit Authority,9 the Commission relied
upon the "broad protective philosophy and purpose" of the Act's
predecessor and found "a duty to provide reasonable accommoda-
tion to handicapped employees."' 10 In May, a former CTA ticket
6. Id. at para. 1-103(I)(4) (1985). The Act contains similar definitions of handi-
capped for purposes of employment and housing discrimination.
7. Jones v. Chicago Transit Authority, - I11. HRC Rep. - (1986); May v. Chicago
Transit Authority, 5 I11. HRC Rep. 154 (1982).
8. Jones v. Chicago Transit Authority, - I11. HRC Rep. - (1986); May v. Chicago
Transit Authority, 5 II1. HRC Rep. 154 (1982).
9. 5 II1. HRC Rep. at 154 (1982).
10. Id. at 157.
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agent claimed that the transit authority discriminated against him
because of his handicap by discharging him and failing to place
him in an alternate position."I May conceded that he could not
perform the job of ticket agent; his determinable physical charac-
teristics were admittedly "related to" his ability to perform that
job. The Commission concluded, however, that May's characteris-
tics would not, as a matter of law, be "related to" his abilities if he
could perform the job with reasonable accommodation. 12 His
characteristics, as a descriptive matter, were "related to" his job
performance. But as a prescriptive matter, they were not related to
that performance.
Although the Commission declared that the issue of reasonable
accommodation must be resolved on a "case-by-case basis,"' 3 it al-
located the burden of proof in such cases. The complainant's
prima facie case must consist of some proof of determinable physi-
cal characteristics, proof that those characteristics would be unre-
lated to job performance if reasonable accommodation were
provided, and proof that the employer has failed to provide such
accommodation.' 4 The burden then shifts to the respondent to
prove, as an affirmative defense, that the accommodation is techno-
logically impossible, or at least would create an "undue hard-
ship."" While the "technological exclusion" excuses the failure to
accommodate in the absence of methods for removing the disabil-
ity, the "burden exclusion" excuses the failure to accommodate
when employers can provide for a handicapped person only by in-
curring excessive burdens.'6
In Jones v. Chicago Transit Authority, 7 the Commission affirmed
the Chief Administrative Law Judge's extension of the duty of ac-
11. Id. at 155.
12. Id. at 158.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. May was originally decided under the Fair Employment Practices Act
("FEPA"), the predecessor to the IHRA. The Commission found that the purposes and
duties in the FEPA were present in the IHRA. In addition, the Commission rested its
understanding of "undue hardship" and reasonable accommodation upon guidelines
promulgated under the FEPA. These guidelines state that an "undue hardship may be
established where, for example, business necessity precludes such an accommodation, or
where the cost of the accommodation would be economically prohibitive ......
16. As a matter of law, the Commission suggests, the relation between characteristic
and ability is acceptable if it cannot be removed at all or can be removed only with an
undue burden. The Commission determined in May that the transit authority had, in
fact, provided reasonable accommodation by assigning the complainant to an administra-
tive position. Id. at 159.
17. - Ill. HRC Rep. - (1986).
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commodation from the employment to the public accommodation
section of the Act. In Jones, complainants who use wheelchairs as
mobility aids filed an action against the transit agency. The com-
plainants alleged that the transit agency's past failure to provide
any public bus service for them, and its current failure to provide
any mainline bus service for them, constituted discrimination
against the handicapped. 8
The respondent moved for summary judgment, arguing that the
complainants, despite their wheelchair use, were not "handi-
capped." The transit agency claimed that complainants' determi-
nable physical characteristics were, in fact, related to their abilities
to use and benefit from a public bus; they simply could not board
or alight inaccessible buses. Concluding, however, that respon-
dent's argument would "eviscerate" the IHRA, the Chief Adminis-
trative Law Judge held that the Act required respondents to
provide accommodation. 19
Upon certification of the issue, the Commission affirmed.20
First, the Commission concluded that the IHRA prohibited acts
by public accommodators performed with the intent to treat handi-
capped persons differently from non-handicapped persons. 2' Sec-
ond, the Commission declared that in addition to prohibiting such
"disparate treatment" or intentional discrimination, the IHRA
reaches neutral policies that have a disparate impact upon handi-
capped persons.22 Accordingly, public accommodators have a
duty not only to refrain from intentional discrimination, but also to
modify their otherwise neutral practices that disparately impact
handicapped persons. The Commission agreed with the Chief Ad-
ministrative Law Judge that the IHRA would lose its meaning if it
did not provide protection from some instances of disparate
impact.
The Commission's conclusion that the Act imposes upon public
accommodators "some duty of accommodation" also was based
upon its finding that cases interpreting Section 504 of the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973 required such a duty by analogy. The only issue
before the Commission, however, was whether summary judge-
ment was proper. Accordingly, the Commission did not precisely
define the scope of the duty of accommodation. The duty can be
18. Id. at-.
19. Id. at-.
20. Id. at-.
21. Id. at-.
22. Id. at-.
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defined, however, through analysis of the Supreme Court's inter-
pretations of Section 504 and allegiance to the prescriptive stan-
dards within the IHRA.
III. THE SECTION 504 PRESCRIPTIVE DUTY OF
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION
The Supreme Court has found an "affirmative duty of reasonable
accommodation" by balancing Section 504's objectives against the
countervailing considerations of manageability, comity, and pro-
gram integrity.
A. The Supreme Court's Rejection of Description
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provides that "[n]o
otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States...
shall, solely by reason of his handicap" be, "excluded from partici-
pation in, "[d]enied the benefits of," or "subjected to discrimina-
tion under any program . . . receiving federal financial assistance
.... ,23 The Rehabilitation Act defines a "handicapped individ-
ual" for purposes of Section 504 as one who has, has a record of
having, or is regarded as having, a "physical or mental impairment
which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life
activities."24 Thus, the definition of a handicapped person within
Section 504 includes all individuals who have impairments that
limit a major life activity regardless of whether that impairment is
related to the person's ability.
The statute, however, does not protect all handicapped persons
from discrimination in federally funded programs. Rather, it pro-
tects only "otherwise qualified" handicapped persons. 5  The
Supreme Court has defined an otherwise qualified individual to be
"one who is able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite of
his handicap. '"26 The Supreme Court's interpretation of otherwise
qualified to mean in spite of highlights the relationship between
one's impairment and one's ability to meet the program's require-
ments. Under a purely descriptive definition of an otherwise quali-
fied handicapped person, Section 504 would protect only those
individuals whose impairments are unrelated to their abilities.
Although it defined otherwise qualified individuals to be those
23. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973).
24. Id. at § 706(7)(B).
25. Id. at § 794.
26. See School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987) (emphasis
added); Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979).
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who in spite of their impairments could meet program require-
ments, the Supreme Court recognized that the legal relation be-
tween impairment and ability could not be entirely descriptive.
Accordingly, in Southeastern Community College v. Davis,2 7 the
Court envisioned situations in which a "refusal to modify" an ex-
isting program might be discriminatory 28 because it would "de-
prive genuinely qualified handicapped" persons of the opportunity
to participate in a federally funded program.29
The Court's shift from otherwise qualified to genuinely qualified
is significant. Section 504's protection should not be limited to
handicapped individuals who can meet program requirements in
spite of their handicaps. Section 504 also protects handicapped in-
dividuals who can meet program requirements only if a program is
modified. These individuals are genuinely qualified. The word
''genuinely" converts the relationship between impairment and
ability from a descriptive one to a prescriptive one. Even those
individuals whose impairments are, as a descriptive matter, related
to their abilities to meet program requirements are, nonetheless,
covered by Section 504 because their impairments are unrelated to
their abilities as a prescriptive matter. They are genuinely qualified
because they can meet a program's requirements if the require-
ments have been modified. Their handicaps do, but need not, pose
a barrier to their participation in a program.
The prescriptive relationship between impairment and ability
implicit in Davis was made explicit in Alexander v. Choate.3° The
Supreme Court unanimously held that Tennessee's reduction in its
annual Medicaid in-patient hospital coverage did not have an un-
lawful disparate impact upon handicapped individuals. 3 ' The
Court assumed, however, that Section 504 reaches some conduct
that has a disparate impact upon handicapped individuals.
That assumption represents a further departure from a purely
descriptive definition of an otherwise qualified individual. Those
individuals who are least qualified for a federally funded program
within the meaning of Section 504 are likely to be those upon
whom the impact of a program's policy is likely to fall most dispa-
rately. To establish a violation of Section 504, handicapped indi-
viduals must show that they are otherwise qualified for a
27. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
28. Id. at 413.
29. Id. at 412 (emphasis added).
30. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
31. Id. at 289.
1987] 1125
Loyola University Law Journal
program32 and that the grantee's conduct has a disparate impact
upon the handicapped. 33 Proof of disparate impact or discrimina-
tion, however, is incompatible with proof that an individual can
satisfy program requirements in spite of his or her handicap. The
evidence that describes the disparate impact of a program at the
same time describes a keen relationship between impairment and
ability. If a violation of Section 504 could be established only by
evidence that shows disparate impact and that does not, at the
same time, show a relation between impairment and ability, a vio-
lation could rarely be established.
The Supreme Court recognized in Choate that if Section 504 was
interpreted descriptively, it would be eviscerated. Accordingly, the
Court separated the issue of whether a handicapped individual is
"otherwise qualified" from the issue of whether discrimination has
occurred. 34 These issues, the Court reasoned, "would seem to be
two sides of a single coin .... "-3 The issue of otherwise qualified,
however, is not logically, factually, or descriptively anything like
the issue of disparate impact. They are incompatible.
The Court is able to combine these issues only by disregarding
the "descriptive" nature of each. By finding that these two incom-
patible issues are really two ways of looking at the same question,
the Court suggests that the purposes of Section 504 are ill-served
by elements of recovery that require descriptive analysis. The
Court replaced these two descriptive elements, otherwise qualified
and disparate impact, with one overriding prescriptive norm. The
"ultimate question," according to the Court, "is the extent to
which a grantee is required to make reasonable modifications in its
programs [to accomodate] the needs of the handicapped." 36 This
question is a normative or prescriptive one: how much should a
grantee be required to do to accommodate the needs of the handi-
capped, regardless of whether they are otherwise qualified? Or, in
terms of the statute, which impairments do, but should not, dis-
qualify a handicapped person from a federal program?
In School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,37 the Supreme
Court took for granted the proposition that Section 504 reaches
claims of disparate impact and interpreted the plain language of
32. See Choate, 469 U.S. at 290.
33. Id. at 299.
34. Id. at 299 n.19.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987).
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"otherwise qualified" in a prescriptive manner.38 A handicapped
person who poses a significant risk of communicating an infectious
disease to others in the workplace will not be otherwise qualified,
but one whose risk can be eliminated by the affirmative obligation
to make reasonable accommodation is otherwise qualified. 9
B. Prescribing the Standard
The adoption of a prescriptive standard immediately raises ques-
tions about the nature of that standard. The Supreme Court found
a statutory "affirmative duty to make reasonable accommoda-
tion"4 by balancing "two powerful but countervailing considera-
tions: the need to give effect to the statutory objectives, and the
desire to keep Section 504 within manageable bounds." '4 1
(1) The Section 504 Statutory Objectives
By enacting Section 504, Congress sought to remedy what it per-
ceived as societal neglect of the handicapped. 42 That neglect typi-
cally was the result of benign indifference rather than invidious
discrimination.43 Barriers to access usually are not erected out of
discriminatory animus; they are established in disregard for handi-
capped individuals. By drafting the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
Congress sought to remove barriers to access whether or not they
were erected out of animus, and to "ensure that handicapped indi-
viduals are not denied jobs or other benefits because of the
prejudiced attitudes or ignorance of others."'  Accordingly, the
Supreme Court found that the Congressional intent to foster inte-
gration of the handicapped into employment, 45 education,46 and
public facilities 47 would "ring hollow" if Section 504 were power-
less to reach "harms resulting from action that discriminated by
effect as well as by design." '48
38. Id. at 1131 n.17.
39. Id. at 1131 n.19.
40. Id.
41. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 299 (1985).
42. Id. at 295.
43. Id. at 295.
44. See School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987).
45. "The primary goal of the Act is to increase employment." Choate, 469 U.S. at
307 n.28 (citing Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 633 n.13 (1984))
("Indeed, enhancing employment of the handicapped was so much the focus of the 1973
legislation that Congress ... felt it necessary to amend the statute .
46. See Choate, 469 U.S. at 307 n.29.
47. See id. at 307 n.30.
48. See id. at 297.
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The statutory rights granted by Section 504 is defined as "equal"
treatment by, and "meaningful access" to, federally funded pro-
grams.49 The Supreme Court declared that the provision is
designed to ensure evenhanded treatment of handicapped individu-
als.5° The right to equal or evenhanded treatment is akin to the
right to be free from disparate treatment or intentional discrimina-
tion.51 In addition, the assurance of "meaningful access" guaran-
tees at least some measure of protection from policies that have a
disparate impact upon handicapped individuals. Grantees must at
least be given the opportunity to compete for program benefits.
The Court suggested, however, that Section 504 affords handi-
capped individuals no guarantee that they will succeed in their
competition with non-handicapped individuals for program bene-
fits.52 The Court interprets Section 504's duty of reasonable ac-
commodation as a guarantee of opportunity, not results.
(2) Countervailing Considerations
In developing its ultimate legal standard, the Supreme Court
balanced the statutory rights of handicapped individuals against
three countervailing considerations. The Court considered the
need to keep Section 504 within manageable bounds, and gave def-
erence to the state charged with using federal funds. The court
also examined the legitimate interests of federal grantees to pre-
serve the integrity of their programs.53
(a) Manageability
The Supreme Court suggested that if Section 504 were inter-
preted to prohibit all program policies that adversely impact upon
handicapped individuals, the statute would become unmanageable.
Such an interpretation would require every recipient of federal
funds to evaluate the effect on the handicapped of every proposed
action, and would require courts and administrative agencies to in-
vestigate countless allegations of conduct that have an adverse im-
pact upon handicapped individuals. The Court emphasized that
the application of Section 504 to all disparate impact claims would
result in overwhelming administrative and adjudicative burdens.54
49. Id. at 301.
50. Id. at 304.
51. Id.
52. The Court finds that the Act does not "guarantee the handicapped equal results
.... Id.
53. Id. at 298-99.
54. Id. at 298.
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(b) Comity
In deciding the prescriptive norm for handicapped access to fed-
erally funded programs, the Supreme Court also was careful not to
allow "major inroads" on a state's power to administer its pro-
grams in accord with its own goals.55 Section 504 itself does not
"require the [s]tate" to alter its definition of a benefit, unless the
benefit is defined to exclude handicapped persons. To conclude
that Section 504 requires each state to redefine its program bene-
fits, according to the Court, would be to hold that Rehabilitation
Act requires the states to find those illnesses particularly affecting
the handicapped more important than other illnesses.56 Nothing in
the legislative history of Section 504 affords Congress the power to
condition federal funding based upon how a state chooses to priori-
tize the illnesses inflicted upon its citizens. The statutory goal of
Section 504, therefore, must be tempered by comity: deference to
the state's policy decisions, particularly in areas in which it has
exercised "longstanding discretion."
The Supreme Court's comity concern is particularly deep be-
cause the duty incumbent upon the states under Section 504 is
rooted in a contract with the federal government. In Pennhurst
State School and Hospital v. Halderman,57 the Supreme Court de-
clared that when Congress intends to impose a condition upon the
grant of federal funds, "it must do so unambiguously. ' 58 The clear
intent of Congress is necessary because federal legislation that
places conditions on the use of federal funds has the nature of a
"contract." 59 The Section 504 contract is based upon a quid pro
quo between the federal government and the states: the states bear
some of the cost of providing opportunity for the handicapped in
consideration for receipt of federal funds. 60 The states cannot be
held to the terms of their contract, however, unless they "know-
ingly and voluntarily" accept those terms.6' Absent a clear expres-
sion of Congressional intent, the states cannot knowingly and
voluntarily accept the conditions attached to the receipt of funds.62
55. In Choate, the Court stopped short of imposing upon the State an affirmative
action duty partly in deference to the State's 'longstanding discretion" to choose the
proper mix of Medicaid coverage for its citizens. The Court's willingness to defer to the
states transcends Medicaid coverage. Id. at 303.
56. Id. at 303-04.
57. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
58. Id. at 17.
59. Id. See also Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123, 1132-33 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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The requirement that Congress express its clear intent is particu-
larly strong when the "contract" struck between the state and fed-
eral government involves an area in which Congress has
traditionally left considerable discretion to the states.63 To the ex-
tent that the contractual duties incumbent upon the states under
Section 504 are unclear, the Supreme Court has indicated that
those duties should be construed narrowly in favor of the states.
(c) Program Integrity
The statutory rights of the handicapped must be further bal-
anced under Section 504 against the legitimate interests of federal
grantees in preserving the integrity of their programs. 64 A pro-
gram's integrity is its "essential nature. ' 65 The "essential nature"
of a program must be assessed on a program-by-program basis.
Hence, the "essential nature" of the nursing program upheld in
Southeastern Community College v. Davis6 6 was to "train persons
who could serve the nursing profession in all customary ways. "67
In Alexander v. Choate,68 the "essential nature" of the State of Ten-
nessee's Medicaid program was "a particular package of health
care services ... [that] has the general aim of assuring that individ-
uals will receive necessary medical care .... "69 The "essential
nature" of the program at issue in School Board of Nassau County
v. Airline was the educational welfare of elementary school chil-
dren in Nassau County, Florida.7 °
Although the definition of a program's "essential nature" turns
on the facts of each case, the Supreme Court has established an
analytical pattern. First, the "essential nature" of a program can-
not be defined with the purpose or effect of disqualifying individu-
als with handicaps.71  For example, in Davis, Southeastern
Community College could not define its nursing program as dedi-
cated to deaf-free nursing care, nor could the College define its pro-
gram by the goal of producing nurses with supersensitive
eardrums. The former goal is an express exclusion of handicapped
63. Id.
64. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300 (1985).
65. See, e.g., Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 413 (1979).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 413.
68. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
69. Id. at 299-300.
70. 107 S. Ct. at 1131 n.16.
71. See, e.g., Choate, 469 U.S. at 301. "The benefit itself, of course, cannot be defined
in a way that effectively denies otherwise qualified handicapped individuals the meaning-
ful access to which they are entitled .... "
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individuals, whereas the latter has the direct effect of excluding
handicapped individuals.
Second, in each case decided under Section 504, the Supreme
Court has suggested that the "essential nature" of a federally
funded program, which cannot be sacrificed, is safety to others. In
Davis, the Supreme Court distilled the College's impenetrable core
value to be the assurance that "no graduate will pose a danger to
the public ... "72 In Choate, the Court described the plaintiff in
Davis as an individual "who would not be capable of safely per-
forming as a registered nurse even with full-time personal supervi-
sion. '' 3 Furthermore, the Court in Choate emphasized that any
modification in Tennessee's Medicaid plan would sacrifice the
"best interests" of other individuals whose particular illnesses are
as "worthy of cure."74 The integrity of Tennessee's program de-
pended upon maintaining the health of others.
Arline also defined the essential nature of the program at issue,
elementary school education, to be safety.75 The Court declared
that an individual "who poses a significant risk of communicating
an infectious disease to others in the work-place will not be other-
wise qualified for his or her job if reasonable accommodation can-
not eliminate that risk."76 Section 504 does not require a school
board to place a teacher with an active contagious disease in the
classroom with elementary school children.77 Thus, the Supreme
Court declared that the "otherwise qualified" analysis should in-
clude a determination of the nature, duration, severity of the health
risk and the probability that the disease will cause "harm."78 The
essential nature of a federally funded program, its integrity, there-
fore, is the nondiscriminatory pursuit of nondiscriminatory pur-
poses, with minimal risk to public safety.
C. The Standard
The Supreme Court's standard for Section 504 compliance is the
product of a balance of the statutory goal of equal opportunity and
the countervailing considerations of manageability, comity, and
program integrity. These competing considerations can be recon-
ciled if grantees are required to make modifications in their pro-
72. 442 U.S. at 413 n.12.
73. 469 U.S. at 300 (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 304.
75. 107 S. Ct. 1131 n.16.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1131.
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grams that will allow equal opportunity without sacrificing the
integrity of their programs. This requires reasonable, not com-
plete, accommodation. Thus, recipients of federal funds have the
"affirmative duty" to accommodate handicapped persons when do-
ing so would not create undue financial and administrative
burdens.
The Supreme Court's program-integrity analysis, however, is an-
terior to its "undue burden" analysis. The Section 504 issue is not
whether a handicapped person can be accommodated without an
undue administrative and financial burden, but whether a grantee
can admit a handicapped person into its program and preserve the
integrity of that program without incurring undue administrative
and financial burdens. A program's integrity is its safe accomplish-
ment of nondiscriminatory purposes. Thus, if a grantee can admit
a handicapped person and maintain the safe accomplishment of le-
gitimate purposes without suffering an undue burden, it must do
so. If, however, preservation of the safe accomplishment of its pur-
poses cannot be accomplished technologically or can only be ac-
complished with an undue financial and administrative burden,
then a grantee need not admit a handicapped person.
Understood in light of its origin and purposes, the prescriptive
duty of reasonable accommodation can be seen as the application
of the "business necessity" defense to charges of handicapped dis-
crimination. Indeed, the Supreme Court's discussion in Choate of
"integrity" is in the context of its presumption that Section 504
reaches instances of disparate impact.79 Since Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 80 the Supreme Court has characterized the defense to a
disparate impact charge as "business necessity." In the classical
formulation of the "necessity" defense the defendant must demon-
strate that its practice is "sufficiently compelling to override any
discriminatory impact," its practice "effectively serves the business
purpose," and "there is available no less discriminatory alterna-
tive."' 81 Hence, the grantee must show that the goals of its policy
are compelling," that the "fit" between the goals and the policy is a
tight one, and that its goals cannot be accomplished by any other
less burdensome means. A discriminatory practice is not justified
79. 469 U.S. 287, 300 (1987).
80. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
81. Liberles v. Daniel, 477 F. Supp. 504, 507 (N.D. Ill. 1979), aff'd in relevant part,
Liberles v. County of Cook, 709 F.2d 1122, 1132 (7th Cir. 1983) (citing Waters v. Wis-
consin Steel Works of International Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976)).
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by "necessity" unless each of these is shown.82
Although the Supreme Court did not itemize these elements of
the business necessity defense in Davis, 3 Choate 4 or Arline,85 it
implicitly found that the proper inquiry in each case was whether
the defendant had met its burden of showing that its practices were
necessary. Hence, in Davis, Southeastern Community College
showed that its purpose "to train persons who could serve the
nursing profession" was compelling, that its admission standards
fit its goal of producing such nurses and that no less discriminatory
alternative existed for meeting its goal because the plaintiff could
not even benefit from any "affirmative action." 6 Similarly, in
Choate, Tennessee showed that its purpose of "assuring that indi-
viduals will receive necessary medical care" was "compelling,"
that the "fit" between the policy of reducing inpatient coverage
and the purpose of providing "necessary" care was tolerable and
that, although less discriminatory alternatives existed, none of
them could have been pursued without unreasonable "administra-
tive costs." ' 87 Finally, in Arline, the Supreme Court remanded to
the district court the issues of whether any "fit" existed between
the discharge of plaintiff for having tuberculosis and the legitimate
school policy of removing health risks from the elementary school
environment, and, if so, whether any less discriminatory practice
could have been pursued without undue hardship.88
The balance between the Section 504 statutory objectives and the
countervailing management burdens, comity concerns, and pro-
gram integrity considerations, therefore, requires grantees to afford
handicapped persons reasonable accommodation. The "affirmative
obligation to make a reasonable accommodation" is normative or
prescriptive. It emanates not from any descriptive account of the
current relationship between handicap and ability, but from a bal-
ance of competing values. The affirmative duty of reasonable ac-
commodation, however, is tantamount to holding grantees liable
82. To prove that its discriminatory policies can be justified by a "business necessity,"
a grantee has a "heavy" burden. Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, 697 F.2d 810, 815 (8th
Cir. 1983). A discriminatory practice cannot be justified by mere routine business consid-
erations. Nor can it be excused by a rational basis for its existence. Liberles, 709 F.2d at
1132; Hawkins, 697 F.2d at 815 (citing Kirby v. Colony Furniture Co., 613 F.2d 696, 703
(8th Cir. 1980)) (emphasis in original).
83. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
84. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
85. 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987).
86. 442 U.S. at 409.
87. 469 U.S. at 308.
88. 107 S. Ct. at 1130-31.
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for discriminatory practices, unless they can be justified by "pro-
gram necessity."
IV. THE ANALOGY BETWEEN SECTION 504 AND THE IHRA
The reasons that led the Supreme Court to dispense with de-
scriptive notions of ability and qualifications should ultimately lead
courts interpreting the IHRA to dispense with such notions. The
IHRA, like Section 504, should be construed in accordance with
prescriptive norms. But the prescriptive standard of the IHRA is
both more ambitious and less encumbered than that of Section 504.
The IHRA establishes equality of result as its goal. The problems
of manageability and comity are insignificant, while the desire to
maintain program integrity remains a factor to be carefully
weighed in the balance.
A. The Abandonment of Descriptive Analysis
By finding that the Act's protections for handicapped persons in
the field of employment and public accommodations would be evis-
cerated absent a duty of accommodation, the Commission implic-
itly recognized that the Act's definition of "handicap" is
prescriptive rather than descriptive. In Jones v. CTA,89 for exam-
ple, the CTA argued that complainants' physical characteristics,
their use of wheelchairs as mobility aids, were related to their abili-
ties to board and alight an inaccessible public bus. There is little
doubt that a physical disability is, as a matter of description, re-
lated to the ability to use an inaccessible public bus. Accordingly,
the administrative law judge and the Commission determined that
excusing the CTA's conduct because complainants' physical char-
acteristics were descriptively related to their abilities to use its pub-
lic buses would render the Act meaningless.
The Commission's decision to develop a prescriptive definition
of "handicap" is fully justified by the Supreme Court's analogous
interpretation of Section 504. The language of Section 504 seems
to protect only those persons with life-activity-limiting impair-
ments who can participate in a federally funded program in spite of
their impairments. Similarly, the language of IHRA protects indi-
viduals whose determinable physical characteristics are unrelated
to their abilities to use and benefit from a place of public accommo-
dation. The IHRA requirement that a characteristic be unrelated
to ability is directly analogous to the Section 504 requirement that
89. - I11. HRC Rep. - (1986).
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ability be present in spite of an impairment. If Section 504, how-
ever, protected only those individuals who "in spite of" their life-
activity limiting impairments could participate in federally funded
programs, the Supreme Court recognized, it would "ring
hollow." 9° The Supreme Court thus abandoned a descriptive defi-
nition of an "otherwise qualified" handicapped person in favor of
the prescriptive "affirmative duty of reasonable accommodation."
Likewise, the Commission, faithful to Supreme Court precedent,
concluded that if the IHRA protected only those individuals whose
determinable physical characteristics were unrelated to their abili-
ties, its substantive protections for handicapped individuals would
go unenforced.
Both the Commission and the Supreme Court recognized that if
substantive protections for the handicapped are to have any po-
tency, they must encompass individuals who cannot, but should be
able to, participate in life's activities. Indeed, the gravaman of an
IHRA handicapped discrimination charge is that a condition exists
that denies a handicapped person the ability to participate in those
activities. The "denial of the ability to participate" is, if not an
essential element of the charge, at least the spur to private enforce-
ment of the IHRA. Yet, if the protections of the IHRA did not
include individuals whose characteristics are descriptively related
to their abilities, they would never be realized. Accordingly, the
IHRA requires a prescriptive standard of protection.
B. Prescribing the Standard
The proper prescriptive standard for IHRA protection emanates
from a balance of the IHRA's statutory objectives against the
countervailing considerations of manageability, comity, and pro-
gram integrity.
(1) The IHRA's Statutory Objectives
The IHRA is a consolidation of prior Illinois laws prohibiting
discrimination.9' It is designed inter alia to provide a mechanism
for the implementation and enforcement of the public policy of the
State of Illinois. The policies, expressly defined in the IHRA, in-
clude securing for all "individuals" within the State, freedom from
discrimination because of handicap, and ensuring the realization of
"full productive capacities."92 The IHRA implements these poli-
90. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 297 (1985).
91. See Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 68, para. 1-102 (1985).
92. Id. at para. 1-102(A), (B).
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cies by creating a private right of action against any person who
denies to any handicapped individual the full and equal enjoyment
of any public place of accommodation.93
The duty to provide full and equal enjoyment requires more than
allowing access, entry, or an opportunity to participate. The
IHRA establishes that, although handicapped persons are not
"like" non-handicapped persons in all respects, they should realize
like enjoyment of public places. Nevertheless, the IHRA does not
permit a handicapped individual's enjoyment of a public place to
be judged solely in relation to a non-handicapped person's enjoy-
ment. A handicapped person has the statutory right to the "full"
enjoyment of a public place absolutely, without reference to the
level of enjoyment afforded non-handicapped persons.94
This is not the language of mere opportunity, participation, or
access; this is the language of result. The Supreme Court in Rob-
erts, Commissioner Minnesota Department of Human Rights v.
United States Jaycees,95 held that the fundamental object of an
identical guarantee of "full and equal enjoyment" to handicapped
persons in the Minnesota Human Rights Statute,96 is to advance
the State's compelling interest in receiving the benefits of their wide
participation in political, economic and cultural life.97 It is the ac-
tual participation of all persons in state citizenship that renders the
state interest compelling. If the state had expressed its interest in
terms of giving a protected class the mere opportunity to compete
for social benefits, the interest advanced would have been that of
the class. Any benefit to the state would be indirect and specula-
tive. It is, therefore, unlikely that such an interest would have
outweighed the first amendment rights at stake. Moreover, if the
state's goal were only opportunity rather than result, that goal
could have been achieved by less intrusive means. The state's in-
terest in "eradicating" discrimination inherent in the "full and
equal enjoyment" language, however, could not be reconciled with
any right to association.
The IHRA's goal is expressed also through the language of re-
sult. Handicapped persons must be allowed the full and equal en-
joyment of public accommodations. The full and equal enjoyment
93. Id. at para. 5-102(A).
94. Id.
95. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
96. MINN. STAT. § 363.03 (1982).
97. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 625. The State's interest in assuring the involvement of pro-
tected classes of individuals in political, economic and cultural life was so compelling that
it outweighed any first amendment right to freedom of association enjoyed by the Jaycees.
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language of the IHRA suggests a prescriptive norm more ambi-
tious than the equality of opportunity standard of Section 504.98
Public accommodators under the IHRA must make those modifi-
cations in their accommodations that are necessary to assure that
individuals with determinable physical characteristics enjoy fully
and equally their public accommodations. The duty commensu-
rate with the prescriptive norm is greater than reasonable
accommodation.99
(2) Countervailing Considerations
In arriving at its prescriptive standard of reasonable accommo-
dation, the Supreme Court balanced against the Section 504 objec-
tives, the need to keep Section 504 within manageable bounds,
deference to the state, and the legitimate interests of federal grant-
ees in preserving the integrity of their programs. Only the last
countervailing consideration holds weight in the balance against
the IHRA's objectives.
(a) Manageability
The attainment of the IHRA's objectives would not render it
unmanageable. In defining Section 504, the Supreme Court noted
that although prohibiting all program policies that have l a dispa-
rate impact upon handicapped persons might be consonant with
the statutory objective, such a prohibition would be unmanage-
able." °  Such a mandate would require grantees to consider the
effect of their programs upon persons with a variety of handicaps
and would create an unwieldly "administrative and adjudicative
burden."'' Neither manageability factor has significance under
the IHRA.
(i) Accommodator's Burden
The Act requires public accommodators to consider the conse-
quences of their policies upon persons with a variety of handi-
98. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, para. 2-102 (1985).
99. The duty incumbent upon governmental instrumentalities that operate public ac-
commodations is still greater. The IHRA requires that such instrumentalities engage in
rigorous affirmative action. That norm, when read in para materia with the full and
equal enjoyment norm, requires nonexempt state actors to make substantial, burdensome
modifications in their accommodations not just to afford opportunity, but to assure the
result of full and equal enjoyment.
100. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 297, 298-99 (1987).
101. Id. at 298.
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caps. 12 Unlike Section 504, however, the Act is specifically
designed to redress private acts of discrimination by any person
against any handicapped "person."' 3 Whereas Section 504 places
conditions upon the allocation of funds to a variety of potentially
protected individuals, the IHRA gives to each handicapped person
a cause of action against any person who discriminates against him
or her."° The Act includes within its definition of handicapped,
persons with a variety of handicaps all of whom have standing to
bring a charge of discrimination. 10 5 If "manageability" were a fac-
tor in determining whether "discrimination" had occurred, a pub-
lic accommodator could presumably defend itself against such
charges by asserting that, although it may have discriminated
against the complainant before the court, it has a good track record
of not discriminating against other handicapped individuals. The
issue before the Commission under the IHRA, however, is not
whether the accommodator generally admits handicapped individ-
uals, but whether the accommodator discriminated against the
complainant.
The Supreme Court has left no doubt that a defendant charged
with acts of discrimination against an individual under a statute
which is designed to protect individuals, cannot defend the action
by claiming that it has a favorable record of treatment of the pro-
tected class.'0 6 The "bottom line" results of an employer's pol-
icy-even if they are nondiscriminatory-cannot provide the
employer with a defense to individual charges of discrimination. 07
Neither Congress nor the Illinois legislature "intended to give an
employer license to discriminate against some employees on the
basis of race ... sex [or handicap] merely because he favorably
treats other members of the employees' group."'0 8 The employer's
or public accommodator's treatment of other members of the com-
plainants' group, as the Supreme Court has declared, "can be 'of
little comfort to the victims of ... discrimination.' "109
102. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, para. 1-103(I) (1985).
103. Id. at para. 5-102(A).
104. Id.
105. The non-exhaustive list of handicaps includes any determinable characteristic
which "may result from disease, injury, congenital condition of birth or functional disor-
der. ... Id. at para. 1-103(I).
106. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
107. Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 701, 708
(1978) (fairness to the class of females as a whole cannot justify unfairness to individual
female employees).
108. Teal, 457 U.S. at 455.
109. Id. at 455 (citing Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 342 (1977)).
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The Supreme Court's reasoning has been applied to individual
cases of handicapped discrimination."' Hence, in Maine Human
Rights Commission v. South Portland,"' the Maine Supreme Court
rejected the transit agency's claims that its failure to accommodate
mobility-limited plaintiffs on its mainline bus system could be ex-
cused because such accommodation might not serve the needs of
other handicapped persons. The court declared:
Even if ramps or lifts are provided on the bus routes, it is certain
that not every handicapped person will be able to make use of
them. The law, however, protects the rights of the individual.
The plaintiffs in this case have demonstrated a violation of their
civil rights. They cannot be relegated to a separate system
merely because the relief they seek does not solve the multitude
of problems experienced by handicapped persons as a class." 2
Under a human rights statute that prohibits individual acts of dis-
crimination, a public accommodator cannot excuse liability by ar-
guing that it is "unmanageable" to accommodate handicapped
individuals because so many different kinds of handicaps exist.
Though this particular "manageability" concern might arguably
have a role when a grantee's performance level in its contract with
the federal government is scrutinized under Section 504 on a pro-
gram-wide basis, it has no role under the IHRA, an antidiscrimina-
tion statute, which, like Title VII and the Maine Human Rights
Act, protects individuals from individual acts of discrimination.
(ii) Enforcement Burdens
The IHRA's objectives can be pursued without creating an un-
manageable administrative or adjudicative burden. This particular
"manageability" concern is not present under the IHRA because
the Illinois legislature established a Human Rights Department
with a specific legislative directive to "enforce" the Act, and a
Human Rights Commission with a specific legislative directive to
"adjudicate," acts of handicapped discrimination. 113 The Commis-
110. In Prewitt v. United States Postal Service, 662 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981), the
Fifth Circuit held that the Postal Service's reliance upon the fact that it had hired numer-
ous handicapped persons was a defense to charges of handicapped discrimination. In
doing so, Prewitt cautioned courts to be "careful not to group all handicapped persons
into one class, or even into broad subclasses." Id. at 307 (citing Gittler, Fair Employment
and the Handicapped: A Legal Perspective, 27 DEPAUL L. REV. 953, 972 n.19 (1978)
("[tihe fact that an employer employs fifteen epileptics is not necessarily probative of
whether he or she has discriminated against a blind person")). Each case of handicapped
discrimination must be judged on its own merits.
111. 508 A.2d 948 (Me. 1986).
112. Id. at 956.
113. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, para. 1-101 (1985).
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sion's charge is to absorb the administrative and adjudicatory bur-
dens associated with enforcing the Act." 4 If such burdens exist,
therefore, the Illinois legislature has decided as a matter of policy
that those burdens are outweighed by enforcement of the Act's
prohibitions.
Moreover, the Commission's effort to find and remedy policies
that have a disparate impact upon handicapped persons will not
create an administrative or adjudicatory burden. Such a burden
might be created when evidence establishing discrimination is vir-
tually impossible to gather, or when the acts constituting discrimi-
nation are virtually impossible to define. The Commission's
enforcement burdens would accordingly be "manageable" when
evidence is tangible and when a bright-line test exists to adjudge
discriminatory acts. Those burdens would, of course, be modest if
the Act, by virtue of its "related to" language, were read to exclude
from its protections all handicapped persons. No claims would be
brought. The burdens, however, would be equally modest if the
"bright-line" were drawn to include within the Act's protections
all individuals with determinable physical characteristics who are
victimized by policies which have a disparate impact upon them.
Disparate impact analysis, in fact, presents modest adjudicatory
burdens. For evidentiary purposes, the ostensibly neutral policy
challenged by the complainant is presumed to be in existence. The
only issue is quantiative-whether the policy has had a dispropor-
tionate impact upon handicapped persons. The defense to a dispa-
rate impact charge may require additional evidence, but the burden
of assembling such evidence, which is at the disposal of the em-
ployer or accommodator, will be borne by the respondent rather
than the Commission. Indeed, cases of disparate impact are ad-
ministratively simple relative to cases of intentional discrimination,
which involve difficult qualitative judgments of state of mind. That
disparate impact litigation may be less burdensome than disparate
treatment litigation suggests that unless the legislature intended
the Commission to abandon any effort to enforce the Act's handi-
capped discrimination prohibitions, the administrative or adjudica-
tory burdens of enforcement would be insignificant in the context
of the IHRA.
(b) Comity
Deference to the state and its agencies charged with using fed-
114. See, e.g., id. at para. 1-102.
1140 [Vol. 18
Handicapped Discrimination
eral funds under Section 504 also is not a "consideration" that
countervails the IHRA's protections. The Supreme Court con-
cluded that Congress had displayed no intent in Section 504 to
make "major inroads" on the power of the states and their agencies
to allocate federal funds, particularly in areas in which the states
have exercised "substantial discretion."' 15 The doctrine of comity
has no application in interpreting the IHRA.
First, federal-state relations are irrelevant to the enforcement of
a state human rights statute. Second, even when a state instrumen-
tality is charged under a local Human Rights Act with discrimina-
tory practices, deference to the instrumentality cannot be defended
when it would be tantamount to deference to unlawful practices.
Third, although deference may be appropriate when a state's
"mix" of federal funds on a program-wide basis is at issue, it is
inappropriate when, as under the IHRA, individual acts of dis-
crimination are cognizable. Fourth, when the State of Illinois and
other states which have passed comparable Human Rights statutes
have expressed a clear intent to outlaw discrimination by individu-
als and state agencies against handicapped individuals, any defer-
ence owed to those states by the courts should lead to more, not
less, judicial scrutiny.
Finally, the contractual nature of the state's obligations under
Section 504 and the resulting duties, are nonexistent under the
IHRA. The duties created by the IHRA are not contractual.
Rather employers and public accommodators have a tort-like duty
which runs toward handicapped individuals. Indeed, the Act de-
clares that it is designed to protect "the interest of all people in
Illinois in maintaining personal dignity," and sanctions the award
of "actual damages" for such "injury," including emotional dis-
tress."1 When a statute protects individuals from the personal af-
front of discrimination and allows them to sue for monetary relief,
such a statute creates a tort-like duty, the breach of which gives
rise to tort-like liability." 7
(c) Program Integrity
The ultimate factor that must be considered in arriving at a pre-
scriptive standard for treatment of the handicapped is the risk to
the integrity or the "essential nature" of the defendant's program.
The determination of the "essential nature" of a place of public
115. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 297, 303 (1987).
116. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, paras. 1-102(B), 8-108 (1985).
117. See, e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
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accommodation under the IHRA must be guided in part by the
Supreme Court's Section 504 analysis.
The IHRA defines a handicapped person as one whose charac-
teristics are unrelated to his or her ability to use and "benefit" from
a place of public accommodation. The Supreme Court suggests,
however, that the "benefit" offered by the facilities and services of
a place of public accommodation cannot be defined to exclude indi-
viduals with determinable physical characteristics."II In Jones,"19
for example, respondents argued that individuals who use wheel-
chairs as mobility aids cannot "benefit" from an inaccessible public
bus. Yet the Supreme Court has rejected such an argument be-
cause it defines the "benefit" of a public bus to be that which indi-
viduals in wheelchairs cannot, because of their handicaps, obtain.
The benefit of a public bus system cannot be defined as "the trans-
portation of able-bodied persons;" it must be defined as "the trans-
portation of all individuals." Moreover, in finding the "essential
nature" of a place of public accommodation, courts interpreting
the IHRA have guidance in the Supreme Court's laborious distilla-
tion of "safety" as the essence of a federal program. When the
"safety" of a place of public accommodation is shown to be truly at
risk, then its integrity or its essential nature is threatened.
The "essential nature" of a place of public accommodation,
however, is different from that of federally funded programs. An
integral part of the essential nature of a public place is its openness
to the public. At common law, innkeepers, public utility opera-
tors, and public transit operators are held to a higher standard of
care precisely because they operate accommodations that hold
themselves out to the public.'2 The operators of public places thus
have an affirmative duty to remove any devices which could
foreseeably harm the public.' 2' The public place achieves its integ-
rity when it permits the public to have safe access. The duty to
118. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 297 (1985).
119. - Ill. HRC Rep. - (1986).
120. In Neering v. Ill. Central R.R. Co., 383 Ill. 366, 50 N.E.2d 497 (1943), a young
woman was assaulted and robbed while she was waiting for her train in the railroad's
station building. The court held the railroad to a standard of ordinary care with respect
to its station buildings, but to the highest standard of care with respect to the operation of
trains and other "immediate incidents of transportation." Id. at 374.
121. In McCoy v. Chicago Transit Authority, 69 Ill. 2d 280, 371 N.E.2d 625 (1977),
the plaintiff, a passenger on a CTA train, was assaulted and battered by three other pas-
sengers. The court held that whether the conductor knew the three passengers were
"bent on mischief" and whether he could have prevented the injuries inflicted on the
plaintiff were questions of fact and that the determination of the trier of fact would not be
set aside.
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ensure safe access to a place of public accommodation does not
threaten its integrity, it maintains its integrity.
C The Proper IHRA Standard
The proper IHRA standard requires a balance of the statutory
goal against significant countervailing considerations. The goal is
to provide full and equal enjoyment of places of public accommo-
dation. That goal need not be sacrificed to manageability or com-
ity, but must be balanced against the desire to maintain the
integrity of the public place of accommodation. The essential na-
ture of a public place is the safe accommodation of the public.
Whereas the prescriptive Section 504 duty must advance the op-
portunity of participation in federally funded programs without
sacrificing manageability, comity, and greater public health risks,
the prescriptive duty created by the IHRA must advance the result
of full and equal enjoyment without sacrificing the safe accommo-
dation of the public. These considerations are reconciled in the
IHRA's affirmative duty to provide to individuals with determina-
ble physical characteristics the full and equal enjoyment of a place
of public accommodation, unless doing so would be impossible or
would pose a greater risk to public safety. 22
V. EVIDENTIARY GUIDELINES
In light of the origin and nature of the duties created by Section
504 and the IHRA, courts can begin to employ a workable eviden-
tiary framework that represents the consolidation of two ap-
proaches in the area of handicapped discrimination. The first
approach is based upon common law breach of contract or tort
claims and the second upon tested anti-discrimination statutes.
122. The proper balance under the IHRA of the statutory norm for employment
discrimination and the desire to preserve the integrity of the employment enterprise,
therefore, may be somewhat different from the balance between the public accommoda-
tion norm and the desire to preserve the integrity of the public place. The employment
norm, which guarantees meaningful access to employment opportunities, must be bal-
anced against the necessities of business. That balance requires access to job opportuni-
ties unless the employer can show that it cannot achieve the policy goals which adversely
affect handicapped persons by any less discriminatory means or could do so, but only by
incurring an undue burden. The public accommodation statutory norm, however, which
requires the assurance of the full and equal enjoyment of public places of accommodation
(not just access) must be balanced against the necessities of operating a public place, one
of which is the very assurance that all individuals receive the full and equal enjoyment of
that place. That balance requires the public accommodators to provide handicapped in-
dividuals the full and equal enjoyment of their accommodations unless they can show
that the policy that has an adverse impact upon these individuals is (1) compelling, and
(2) can, under no circumstances, be achieved by less discriminatory means.
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A. The Common Law Framework
Under the "common law" model, Section 504 is viewed as a con-
tract between the federal government and the states. The Section
504 contract requires the federal government to fund a state's pro-
grams in consideration for the state's performance of its contrac-
tual duty to provide reasonable accommodation for handicapped
persons in those programs. Individuals with life-activity-limiting
impairments are the interested third-party beneficiaries to this con-
tract. Accordingly, they have standing to sue for nonperformance.
Their cause of action, however, depends upon a contractual duty
that runs between the state and the federal government, rather
than directly from the state to the individual.
In order to state a cause of action for breach of contract, there-
fore, the plaintiff must show that a binding contract was entered,
that he or she was an intended third-party beneficiary of the con-
tract, that the contract was breached and that damages resulted.
There is seldom a doubt that the Section 504 contract exists.
Moreover, there is rarely a dispute that an individual with a life-
activity-limiting impairment is a beneficiary of the contract, or that
damages flowed from any breach. Therefore, the true issue in most
cases will be whether the breach occurred. Under this contractual
framework, the plaintiff must show that the state breached its af-
firmative duty to provide reasonable accommodation.
After the prima facie case is made, the defendant is entitled to
advance all of the familiar breach of contract defenses. The de-
fense most often invoked will be impossibility or commercial im-
practicability. Such a defense would require proof that
accommodation is impossible, is possible but only with undue fi-
nancial or administrative burdens, or is possible but only by sacri-
ficing the program's "essential nature."
Under the IHRA, by contrast, courts should employ a common
law tort analysis which is comprised of issues of duty, breach, cau-
sation and damages. The IHRA establishes a standard of care to
which public accommodators must adhere. Like the common law
duties placed upon providers of public accommodations, the Act's
duties are heightened; the accommodator must provide the full and
equal enjoyment of the public place. Breach of that duty is negli-
gence per se. But in suing on a negligence theory, the complainant
must demonstrate that he or she is a member of a class that the
legislature intended to benefit. Although not all individuals with
determinable physical characteristics are "handicapped" according
to the Act's language, they are undisputedly part of a class that the
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legislature intended to benefit. Hence, individuals with determina-
ble physical characteristics can establish that public accommoda-
tors owe them a duty to provide full and equal enjoyment. When
full and equal enjoyment has not been provided, the duty has been
breached. The breach invariably is the proximate cause of the in-
jury alleged.
The respondent, however, must have the opportunity not only to
rebut each element of the prime facie case, but also to advance
classic tort defenses. The appropriate tort defense is "necessity."
That defense allows a tortfeasor to avoid liability by showing that
he or she had no choice but to commit the tort. The doctrine has
evolved to recognize, however, that tortious behavior is defensible
if it is the product of a choice between the lesser of two evils.
Hence, destroying a building to stop the spread of fire through a
town is not justified because the actor did not exercise free will;
rather it is justified because the destruction of private property is a
lesser evil than allowing the destruction of an entire town. The
public good outweighed the private harm. The tortious act of de-
stroying a building, however, could not be justified by private
good. 123
A public accommodator thus cannot successfully claim that the
tort of the denial of full and equal enjoyment is necessary simply
because the alternative would create private financial and adminis-
trative burdens. The public accommodator can, however, show
that given the current state of technology, the tort is impossible to
avoid. Moreover, the "necessity" defense also allows the public
accommodator to show that the tort is justified because to do
otherwise would create a greater public evil. Such a greater public
evil can be a significant risk to the health of the public or of the
victim of the tort.
Under the common law approach, therefore, an IHRA respon-
dent can prevail only by showing that its breach of duty was una-
voidable or was necessary to prevent a greater public health risk.
123. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 24 (5th ed. 1984). For example, consider
Parade Overlook Inc., a hypothetical company that has sold rooftop space for viewing an
upcoming Thanksgiving Day Parade. The night before the parade, just in time for the
Thanksgiving Day football game, Parade Overlook Inc.'s neighbors erect and refuse to
modify a rooftop sattelite dish, which obstructs Parade Overlook Inc.'s rooftop view.
The Parade Overlook Inc. president is faced with an exigency. If she leaves the sattelite
dish in place, she will not only lose substantial income and face the administrative bur-
dens of litigation from her customers, but she will lose her entire enterprise. Alterna-
tively, if she destroys the sattelite dish she will have committed a tort. Although her
plight is sympathetic, she will be held liable for the tort because the tort is a greater evil
than the private administrative and financial burdens she will unquestionably suffer.
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A Section 504 defendant, however, can prevail by showing that its
contractual breach is excused by commercial impracticability or
undue administrative and financial burdens.
B. The Disparate Impact Statutory Framework
The disparate impact model is appropriate to handicapped dis-
crimination cases. First, most cases of handicapped discrimination
allege disparate impact. Second, the Supreme Court's manageabil-
ity concern, which led it to suggest that not all disparate impact
cases would be successful, does not undermine the disparate im-
pact structure, which should be used in successful cases. Third, to
the extent that manageability is a factor, it can be eliminated by
burden-shifting within the evidentiary structure.
In order to establish a prima facie case, a handicapped person
must show a qualifying condition-a life-activity-limiting impair-
ment under Section 504, or a determinable physical characteristic
under the IHRA. A handicapped person must also show an ad-
verse effect-denial of program benefits under Section 504 or de-
nial of full and equal enjoyment under the Act. Finally, there must
be evidence that the adverse effect is disparate-individuals with-
out qualifying conditions received program benefits or obtained the
full and equal enjoyment of a public place.
Once a plaintiff presents a prima facie case, the burden shifts to
the grantee or the public accommodator to establish the fundamen-
tal business necessity defense to a charge of disparate impact. To
sustain this defense, a grantee must show that the purpose of its
program is legitimate, that its method of achieving that purpose is
both legitimate and "fits" the purpose, and that no less discrimina-
tory alternatives exist.
The "affirmative duty of reasonable accommodation" fits neatly
into this last prong of the business necessity defense. Defendants
are not required to utilize each and every less discriminatory alter-
native. They can prevail by showing that no less discriminatory
alternative exists, or that a less discriminatory alternative exists,
but would create a greater public safety risk or an undue adminis-
trative and financial burden.
Because the prescriptive duty under the IHRA differs from that
under Section 504, so too does the nature of this business necessity
defense. The public accommodator can prevail if it first shows that
its goals are both legitimate and not designed to exclude handi-
capped persons. The accommodator, however, must also prove
that the methods by which its goals are achieved do not exclude
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handicapped persons or perpetuate stereotypical notions about
handicapped persons. Finally, the accommodator must demon-
strate also that no less discriminatory alternatives exist. As under
Section 504, the IHRA does not require accommodators to pursue
every imaginable alternative. Rather, the accommodators must
show that no less discriminatory alternative exists or that any less
discriminatory alternative that does exist would create a greater
risk to public safety. The prescriptive standard under the IHRA,
however, does not allow the public accommodator to prevail by
showing that the safe accommodation of handicapped persons
would create private financial or administrative burdens.
C. The Frameworks Tested
The evidentiary frameworks can be demonstrated by way of ex-
ample. A soda fountain is charged with handicapped discrimina-
tion because it has only one door, too narrow to admit
complainant, an individual who uses a wheelchair as a mobility
aid.
Under the statutory model, complainant establishes a prima fa-
cie case of handicapped discrimination by showing that she has a
determinable physical characteristic and that the soda fountain has
an ostensibly neutral policy which has a disparate impact upon her.
There is rarely a dispute about these two elements of the prima
facie case. The burden then shifts to the public accommodator to
prove that its neutral policy is justified by "necessity." The accom-
modator must first establish that its reason for the narrow door is
compelling-that it is not based upon the desire to exclude people
in wheelchairs, but based upon a legitimate business objective.
Hence, the accommodator must disprove that the door's structure
is designed to attract able-bodied customers. Second, the accom-
modator must prove that the narrow door does not serve a compel-
ling objective by perpetuating stereotypes. For example, the
accommodator must show that the door's structure is not designed
to attract and retain customers who do not want to interact with
individuals in wheelchairs.
Finally, the accommodator must show the absence of less dis-
criminatory alternatives by producing evidence that the door's
structure is either impossible to alter, or is impossible to alter with-
out creating a greater public health risk. The former defense al-
lows the accommodator to prove, for example, that the structure of
the soda shop necessitates a narrow door, and, therefore, the ac-
commodator has no choice but to maintain the door. The latter
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defense permits the accommodator to introduce evidence showing
that any modification of the door's structure would create a risk to
public safety.
The substance of a handicapped discrimination case under the
statutory model is virtually identical to that under the common
law models. Complainant establishes a prima facie case by show-
ing that the soda fountain operator, as a public accommodator,
owes him a duty of care to provide the full and equal enjoyment of
the soda fountain, that the duty has been breached, and that breach
has resulted in an injury. The soda fountain operator then, as
under the statutory model, has the opportunity to prove that its
conduct is justified by "necessity:" the conduct was either the
product of the absence of choice or the product of the decision to
avoid a greater public evil such as a significant health risk. Under
Section 504, of course, a grantee would have the additional defense
of showing an undue burden, which is tantamount to both the
commercial impracticability defense to a contract claim and the
"no less discriminatory alternative which does not create an undue
burden" defense to a disparate impact charge.
VI. CONCLUSION
By drawing upon the past and maintaining flexibility for the fu-
ture, courts, adjudicative bodies, and litigants can lend clarity to
the duties that public accommodators owe to handicapped persons.
With an eye to the past, they can glean evidentiary standards that
fall into a common law and statutory burden-shifting structure.
Once the prima facie case of refusal to accommodate is established,
the burden shifts to the accommodator to prove the affirmative de-
fense of necessity. With an eye toward the future, courts, adjudica-
tive bodies, and litigants can draw upon the Supreme Court's
attempt to balance on a continuing basis the goals of the statutory
protections for the handicapped with relevant countervailing con-
siderations such as manageability, comity, and the integrity of the
program under scrutiny. State law protections for the handi-
capped, of which the IHRA is an excellent model, need be sacri-
ficed only when accommodation is impossible or would create a
significant public health risk.
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